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Abstract 
This paper compares the relative performance of quality adjusted life years (QALYs) 
based on quality weights elicited by rating scale (RS), time trade-off ('Iq?O) and standard 
gamble (SG). The standard against which relative performance is assessed is individual 
preference elicited by direct ranking. The correlation between predicted and direct ranking 
is significantly higher for TTO-QALYs than for RS-QALYs and SG-QALYs. This holds 
both based on mean Spearman rank correlation coefficients calculated per individual and 
based on two social choice rules: the method of majority voting and the Borda rule, 
Undiscounted TTO-QALYs are more consistent with direct ranking than discounted TTO- 
QALYs. 
JEL classification: C91; I10 
Keywords: Cost utility analysis; Health state utility measurent; Individual preferences 
1. Introduction 
Cost-effectiveness analysis in which costs arc measured in monetary units and 
health effects are measured in non-monetary units is at the moment the most 
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common approach to carry out economic evaluations of health care programmes. 
To measure the effects of different medical interventions in a comprehensive way, 
an outcome measure is needed that simultaneously takes into account quality of 
life and quantity of life. Quality adjusted life years (QALYs) have been proposed 
as a measure that can accommodate his requirement. Cost-effectiveness analysis 
in which QALYs are used as the outcome measure is generally referred to as cost 
utility analysis (Drummond et al., 1987). 
QALYs are calculated by adjusting life years for the quality of life in which 
they are spent. Health states are assigned a quality weight that lies between 0 and 
1. Three principal methods exist to estimate these quality weights based on the 
preferences of individuals: i the rating scale (RS), the time trade-off (TTO) and 
the standard gamble (SG). 2 Empirical studies have produced evidence that these 
three methods elicit different quality weights, the general pattern being that, given 
common scaling, the standard gamble elicits higher quality weights than the time 
trade-off which in turn elicits higher weights than the rating scale (see, for 
example, Torrance (1976), Wolfson et al. (1982), Read et al. (1984) and Horn- 
berger et al. (1992)). The worrying implication of these findings is that QALY 
based decision making may lead to different policy recommendations depending 
on which of the three methods is used to elicit the quality weights. 
No consensus currently exists as to which of the three methods should be 
preferred. Several authors have argued that from a theoretical point of view the 
standard gamble is the preferred method (e.g. Weinstein and Fineberg, 1980; 
Torrance and Feeny, 1989). The standard gamble has a well-established axiomatic 
foundation, being an appropriate method to measure yon Neumann Morgenstern 
expected utilities. This point of view has been disputed by Broome (1993) and 
Richardson (1994), among others. Richardson argues firstly that the axioms 
underlying expected utility theory are empirically flawed, and secondly that the 
theoretical basis for expected utility theory is defective. In Richardson's opinion, 
the time trade-off comes closest o four criteria that are necessary to ensure that a 
measurement unit satisfies the purported objective of QALYs: the combination of 
quantity of life and quality of life into a single measure that can be used in cost 
utility analysis. Broome on the other hand argues that both standard gamble and 
time trade-off are unnecessarily restrictive in terms of the individual preference 
relation, and that for this reason the rating scale should be the preferred method. 
Empirical studies comparing the three assessment methods can be broadly 
divided into two categories: studies that take one of the methods (typically the 
standard gamble) as the standard against which the performance of the other 
J In this paper we use the term "quality weights." Other terms are in use as well, for example 
"preference scores." In the context of this paper these terms are equivalent. 
2 There exist other approaches to estimate quality weights for health states, for example Nord (1995) 
has used and advocated the person trade-off technique. 
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methods is judged and studies that only compare the quality weights elicited by 
the three methods without drawing any inferences about their relative perfor- 
mance. 
This paper is rooted in decision theory. The purpose of decision theory is to 
explain individual preference relations (Fishburn, 1970; Wakker, 1989). Axiomati- 
zations are aimed at making the individual preference relations tractable by means 
of a model. In this paper we take individual preference relations with respect o 
health profiles as the basic data to be explained. QALYs are considered to be a 
model to explain individual preferences concerning health profiles. 3 In order to 
interpret QALYs as a model several restrictive assumptions have to be imposed 
(see, for example, Pliskin et al. (1980); Broome (1993); Bleichrodt (1995)). 
Depending on which method is used to measure the quality weights, three types of 
models can be distinguished: (i) QALYs based on standard gamble weights 
(SG-QALYs); (ii) QALYs based on time trade-off weights (TTO-QALYs); and 
(iii) QALYs based on rating-scale weights (RS-QALYs). The aim of the present 
study is to examine by means of an experiment which of these three models 
corresponds most closely to individual preferences, measured by the direct ranking 
of health profiles. The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly 
describe the standard gamble, the time trade-off and the rating scale. Section 3 
describes the design of the experiment by means of which we aim to test the 
correspondance of SG-QALYSs, TTO-QALYs and RS-QALYs with the direct 
ranking of health profiles. Section 4 contains a description of the analytical 
methods used in the paper. The results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 
contains concuding remarks. 
2. Standard gamble, time trade-off and rating scale 
Extensive discussions of the standard gamble, the time trade-off and the rating 
scale can be found elsewhere in the literature (Torrance, 1986; Drummond et al., 
1987. Here we confine ourselves to a concise description. 
In the standard gamble method quality weights for health states are determined 
by comparing a specific number of years in health state Q for certain with a 
gamble (treatment) offering two reference outcomes, which are typically full 
health for the same number of years and immediate death. The probability (p )  of 
3 It is important to note that his interpretation f QALYs as a utility model based on individual 
preferences, which underlies this paper, is not shared by all authors in the field. According to one line 
of research represented by, for instance, Williams (1985), the trade-off between quality and quantity of 
life is a socio-political question and QALYs need not necessarily reflect individual preferences. Nord 
(1994) has also argued in favour of using QALYs as a measure of social value rather than individual 
utility. 
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full health is varied until the respondent is indifferent between the two alternatives. 
This indifference probability is the weight to be assigned to health state Q. 
The time trade-off method, developed by Torrance et al. (1972), requires a 
respondent to compare Y years in a particular health state Q to X years in full 
health. The number X is varied until the respondent is indifferent between the 
alternatives. The quality weight assigned to health state Q is then set equal to 
x/v. 
Finally, in the rating scale method a respondent locates the health state(s) to be 
assessed on a line calibrated from 0 (immediate death) to 100 (full health). The 
scale is subsequently normalized to immediate death = 0 and full health = 1 and 
the resulting health state weight is calculated by dividing the rating scale weight 
by 100. 
3. Design of the experiment 
The aim of the experiment is to examine the relative performance of SG-QALYs, 
TTO-QALYs and RS-QALYs in terms of their ability to predict individual 
preferences over health profiles. Respondents were 80 students from the Stock- 
holm School of Economics and 92 students from the Erasmus University Rotter- 
dam. The students were paid approximately $15 for their participation i  the study. 
The experiment was carried out in different sessions lasting approximately 1 h 
with on average 10 individuals per session. The procedure followed in each 
session was first to explain the task to respondents, then to ask respondents to 
perform the specific task and then to explain the next task. A "master version" of 
the experiment was designed in English. This "master version" was subsequently 
translated into Swedish and Dutch. Before drafting the final version, we tested the 
questionnaire extensively both in Stockholm and in Rotterdam using faculty staff 
members as respondents. 
We selected eight health states to be included in the questionnaire. The health 
states were taken from the Maastricht Utility Measurement Questionnaire, a
slightly adapted version of the McMaster Health Utility Index (Bakker et al., 1994; 
Rutten-van Mtitken et al., 1995). The selected health states correspond to com- 
monly occurring types of back pain and rheumatism. Health states in the Maas- 
tricht Utility Measurement Questionnaire consist of six attributes. We excluded 
two attributes, side effects of medicines and anxiety about prognosis, from the 
health state descriptions. These attributes were excluded because they were not 
essential for the purposes of this experiment and because we feared that giving too 
much information to respondents might unnecessarily complicate the tasks they 
were faced with. The remaining four attributes were general daily acivities, self 
care, leisure activities and pain. The attributes and the levels of the attributes are 
shown in Table 1. The health states were indicated by capital letters and were 
described on a set of cards, which were handed out to respondents atthe beginning 
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Table 1 
The multi-attribute h alth status classification system used in the experiment 
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General daily activities 
(1) Able to perform all tasks at home and/or  at work without problems 
(2) Able to perform all tasks at home and/or  at work, albeit with some difficulties 
(3) Not able to perform some tasks at home and/or  at work 
(4) Not able to perform many tasks at home and/or  at work 
(5) Not able to perform any task at home and/or  at work 
Self care 
(1) Able to perform all self care activities (eating, washing, dressing) without problems 
(2) Able to perform all self care activities (eating, washing, dressing), albeit with some difficulties 
(3) Not able to perform some self care activities (eating, washing, dressing) 
(4) Not able to perform many self care activities (eating, washing, dressing) without help 
(5) Not able to perform any self care activity (eating, washing, dressing) without help 
Leisure activities 
(1) Able to perform all types of leisure activities without difficulties 
(2) Able to perform all types of leisure activities, albeit with some difficulties 
(3) Not able to perform certain types of leisure activities 
(4) Not able to perform many types of leisure activities 
(5) Not able to perform any type of leisure activities 
Pain and/or  other complaints 
(1) No pain and/or  other complaints 
(2) Now and then light to moderate pain and/or  other complaints 
(3) Often light to moderate pain and/or  other complaints 
(4) Often moderate to severe pain and/or  other complaints 
(5) Always severe pain and/or  other complaints 
of each session. Health state D, which is relevant for the analysis of this paper is 
described in Table 2. 
We divided the questionnaire into different sections. The first substantive task 
respondents were confronted with was the ranking of six of the health states in 
terms of desirability to themselves. For reasons not related to the present study the 
6 health states to be ranked varied per session. However, for every respondent 
health state D was included in the ranking task. After the ranking task respondents 
were asked to locate the health states on a rating scale. In the third section 
respondents answered three time trade-off questions. All respondents answered a
Table 2 
Description of health state D used in the experiment 
• Unable to perform some tasks at home and/or  at work 
• Able to perform all self care activities (eating, washing, dressing) albeit with some difficulties 
• Unable to participate in many types of leisure activity 
• Often moderate to severe pain and/or  other complaints 
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question where one of the alternatives was 30 years in health state D. The answer 
to this time trade-off question is used in the subsequent analysis of this paper as 
the time trade-off quality weight for health state D. Value elicitation was on a line 
with numbers of years in full health. Respondents were encouraged to indicate first 
the values of X, the number of healthy years, for which they definitely preferred 
30 years in health state D, then the values of X for which they definitely preferred 
X years in full health and finally those values of X for which they found it hard to 
choose between the alternatives. Respondents were explained that they could 
indicate a range of values for X for which they found it hard to choose, but they 
were encouraged to make this range as small as possible. This format was adopted 
to allow respondents o express imprecision of preferences (Dubourg et al., 1994). 
Trading off life years is a task respondents are relatively unfamiliar with and their 
preferences may be somewhat imprecise. In our format we attempted to take this 
imprecision of preference into account. For individuals who indicated a range of 
values for X, we used the mid-point of this interval as their time trade-off quality 
weight for health state D. 
Section four consisted of three standard gamble questions. All versions of the 
questionnaire contained a question where 30 years in health state D was the 
certain option. Respondents' answers to this question were used in the analysis. 
Probability elicitation was by means of a line of values for the probability of 
successful treatment (full health). Next to this line a line was drawn with the 
complementary probability of failure of treatment (immediate death). This display 
was chosen in an attempt o control for a potential framing bias: only displaying 
the probability of successful treatment might cause individuals to focus on 
successful treatment, not sufficiently taking into account he probability of failure 
of treatment. Psychological evidence on the influence of reference effects on 
choice is abundant (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Similar to the time 
trade-off question, an attempt was made to take imprecision of preferences into 
account. Respondents were asked first to indicate those values of p, the probabil- 
ity of successful treatment, for which they definitely preferred the certain option, 
then those values of p for which they definitely preferred the treatment option 
(gamble) and finally those values of p for which they found it hard to choose. For 
individuals who indicated a range of values for p, we used the mid-point of this 
interval as their standard gamble quality weight. 
In section five the respondents were asked to rank seven health profiles, i.e. 
combinations of quality of life and quantity of life, in terms of desirability to 
themselves. The ranking exercise was intended to measure individual preferences 
for health states directly. The health profiles were printed on a set of cards which 
were distributed together with the questionnaire and the set of health states. This 
ranking task was similar to the task in section one, except that the objects to be 
ranked were health profiles rather than health states. The seven health profiles are 
described in Table 3. The seven health profiles differed over 20 years. After 20 
years all profiles resulted in death. Profiles lasting less than 20 years resulted in 
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Table 3 
The seven health profiles included in the experiment 
161 
Number profile Years in full health Years in D Years dead 
! 0 20 0 
2 18 0 2 
3 16 0 4 
4 14 0 6 
5 12 0 8 
6 8 8 4 
7 6 11 3 
earlier death. In the case of mixed health profiles consisting both of years in full 
health and years in D, the years in full health always came first. It was expected, 
and confirmed in the pilot sessions, that profiles of decreasing quality of life are 
more intuitive to respondents han profiles of increasing quality of life. 
To be able to compare the relative performance of SG-QALYs, TTO-QALYs 
and RS-QALYs in terms of the direct ranking of the health profiles, health profiles 
are needed that will be ranked differently if the QALY weight differs between the 
methods. The seven health profiles were therefore selected with the intention in 
mind to produce different rankings for SG-QALYs, TTO-QALYs and RS-QALYs. 
Table 4 uses hypothetical weights between 0.5 and 1.0 to show how the implied 
QALY ranking of the profiles differs for different quality weights. The experiment 
was designed with a time trade-off quality weight of about 0.7 in mind. Because 
empirical evidence has indicated that the standard gamble generally results in 
higher quality weights than the time trade-off which in turn gives higher weights 
than the rating scale, we hoped to create the conditions under which the implied 
rankings for SG-QALYs, TTO-QALYs and RS-QALYs were likely to differ. In 
the pilot test the average time trade-off weight for health state D was about 0.69. 
Table 4 
Implied QALY rankings of the seven health profiles for different quality weights with no discounting t 
Number Weight = 0.5 Weight = 0.6 Weight = 0.7 Weight = 0.8 Weight = 0.9 Weight = 1.0 
profile rank rank rank rank rank rank 
1 7 6 3 2 1 | 
2 l 1 1 1 1 2 
3 2 2 2 2 3 4 
4 3 3 3 6 6 6 
5 4 6 7 7 7 7 
6 4 4 6 5 5 4 
7 6 5 5 4 4 3 
1 When two profiles are given the same ranking (e.g. profiles 1 and 2 with a weight of 0.9) this 
signifies a tie (i.e. the number of QALYs is the same for both profiles). 
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The standard gamble weight was 0.76 and the rating scale weight was 0.36. Health 
state D appeared to be a good candidate to test the ranking properties and was 
therefore selected. Note that the ranking of some of the health profiles in Table 4 
will by definition be the same for all the QALY measures. Profiles 2-5 for 
instance consist of profiles of varying duration in full health followed by death. 
We included profiles 2-5 in the experiment to ensure variation in the ranking of 
all profiles over a rather wide range of quality weights. Without enough variation 
in the rankings over the range of quality weights we might not detect differences 
between the methods in correlation with the direct ranking. If the three methods 
resulted in different quality weights, but the rankings did not vary, then over this 
range of quality weights our analysis would not be informative. 
In economic evaluations of health care programmes costs and effects are 
generally adjusted for their timing, by discounting at a fixed rate (see Gafni and 
Torrance (1984) for an analysis of time preference in health). To examine to what 
extent discounted QALY maximization models are consistent with the individual 
preference relation, rankings were compared for various discount rates. Discount- 
ing implies that life years get different weights. Johannesson et al. (1994) have 
shown that in the case of discounting, in order to be consistent with individual 
preferences, the time trade-off quality weights have to be adjusted for discounting. 
This is achieved by discounting the equivalent number of years in full health and 
the 30 years in health state D before the quality weight is derived. Johannesson et 
al. also argued that the standard gamble weights are not affected by discounting, 
because the time horizon is the same for the assessed health state and for full 
health. The intuition behind their argument is as follows. The validity of standard 
gamble weights for health states depends on a preference condition which has to 
be imposed on top of the von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms: utility indepen- 
dence of health status from time duration. This means that utilities for health states 
can be assessed holding the time duration constant both for the certain outcome 
and for the gamble outcomes. Given a common time duration, even if individuals 
apply a positive rate of discount o life years, this will affect all outcomes in a 
similar way and thus the standard gamble weights are not affected by positive 
discounting. 
The rating scale quality weight is elicited without reference to time duration 
and therefore no adjustment for discounting is necessary. 
4. Methods of analysis 
The seven health profiles were translated for each respondent to SG-QALYs, 
TTO-QALYs and RS-QALYs on the basis of the elicited quality weights. The 
predicted rankings of the health profiles were then compared with the direct 
ranking which was elicited in section five of the questionnaire. We examined the 
predictive power of SG-QALYs, TTO-QALYs and RS-QALYs both at the indi- 
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vidual and at the societal evel. At the individual evel, we compared for each 
individual the predicted ranking of the health profiles by each of the three models 
with the direct ranking. To assess the strength of the association we calculated for 
each individual and for each method the Spearman rank correlation coefficient 
between the predicted ranking and the direct ranking. These rank correlation 
coefficients were then averaged over all individuals. The Spearman rank correla- 
tion coefficient is a non-parametric technique which is applicable to ordinal data. 
Given that the direct ranking data were ordinal, parametric correlation coefficients 
could not be applied. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient lies between - 1 
and 1, a higher value indicating stronger positive association between the ranks, a 
value of zero indicating no association. The QALY measure with the highest 
average Spearman rank correlation coefficient is most closely associated with the 
direct ranking of the health profiles. 
For the analysis at the societal level we had to aggregate individual preferences 
into social preference. A problem arises here because of the nature of our data. 
The direct ranking only provides information with respect to the ordering of 
profiles. No cardinal information is available. Arrow (1951, t963) has proved that 
it is impossible to construct a social ordering from individual orderings, that 
satisfies four "very mild looking conditions" (Sen, 1970) 4. We examined two 
simple social choice rules, each violating one of Arrow's conditions. First, we 
applied the method of majority voting. Ranking one profile above another was 
interpreted to be a vote in favour of the former. We constructed a social preference 
relation from an examination of the votes between every possible pair of profiles. 
A problem with the social preference relation thus constructed is that it need not 
be transitive. Therefore we also constructed a social preference relation based on 
the Borda rule. The Borda rule assigns points to profiles corresponding to the 
ranks of the profiles and then sums these points over all individuals. The points 
assigned to a profile were set equal to the rank of the profile. That is, we assigned 
points in descending order, i.e. a lower number meaning "more preferred." The 
Borda rule satisfies transitivity, but violates the condition Arrow refers to as 
"independence of irrelevant alternatives." According to this condition social 
preference between two alternatives should not be affected by a third alternative. 
The method of majority voting and the Borda rule each satisfy a different subset of 
Arrow's conditions. The union of these sets consists of Arrow's conditions. 
In interpreting the results on majority voting it is important o realize that the 
two exercises of ranking health profiles in terms of their desirability for the 
individual and of voting between health profiles, which we set equal, may in fact 
not be equivalent. In a voting situation the individual may consider the desirability 
of the alternatives both for themselves and for others whereas in the ranking task 
4 The four conditions most frequently referred to are unrestricted domain, weak Pareto principle, 
independence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship. 
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respondents were asked to consider the alternatives in terms of desirability to 
themselves (see Labelle and Hurley (1992) for a discussion of the potential 
importance of preferences over outcomes for others). 
It is worth emphasizing here that the analysis of the results we present in 
Section 5 is based on statistical significance. Statistical significance need not 
necessarily equal economic significance. That is, observed statistically significant 
differences may not be meaningful. We discuss the difference between statistical 
significance and meaningfulness in more detail in Section 6. 
5. Results 
5.1. Disparity between the methods 
Differences in ranking performance can only occur if the three methods 
produce different weights. Table 5 shows that the mean quality weights for 
standard gamble, time trade-off and rating scale indeed differ significantly. 
Differences are significant at the 0.1% level, both for the Dutch, the Swedish and 
the total sample. The difference between the Dutch and the Swedish sample is not 
significant (p >0.10) for the time trade-off and the standard gamble quality 
weights. However, for the rating scale the difference is significant at the 10% level 
(p = 0.09). Compared to the results of the pilot study the standard gamble weights 
and the time trade-off weights are approximately 0.10 lower, whereas the rating 
scale weight is slightly higher. 
5.2. Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
Table 6 displays the mean of the Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
between the direct rankings and the rankings predicted by RS-QALYs, TTO- 
QALYs and SG-QALYs, respectively. Both in the Dutch and in the Swedish 
sample TTO-QALYs are significantly stronger correlated with the direct ranking 
than RS-QALYs and SG-QALYs. The difference between RS-QALYs and SG- 
Table 5 
Mean SG, TTO and RS quality weights (preference scores) for health state D. Standard errors within 
parentheses 
Method Dutch sample Swedish sample Total sample Difference, NL -S  
RS 0.3867 1 (0.0149) 0.4274 1 (0.0191) 0.4056 I (0.0199) p = 0,092 
TTO 0.5958 1,2 (0.0238) 0.5575 1,2 (0.0237) 0.5780 1,2 (0,01684) n.s. 
SG 0.6786 2 (0.0279) 0.6620 2 (0.0257) 0.6709 2 (0.0191) n.s. 
1 Significantly different from SG at 99% confidence level. 
2 Significantly different from RS at 99% confidence l vel, 
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Table 6 
Mean Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the direct ranking and the predicted rankings of 
RS-QALYs, TTO-QALYs and SG-QALYs. Standard errors within parentheses. No discounting 
Comparison Dutch sample Swedish sample Total sample Difference, NL -  S 
RS--direct 0.7208 (0.033) 0.7932 (0.027) 0,7545 (0.022) p = 0.088 
TTO--direct 0,8194 1,2 (0.027) 0.8669 1,2 (0.018) 0,8415 2,3 (0,017) n,s, 
SG--direct 0.6891 (0.036) 0.7684 (0.027) 0.7259 (0.023) p = 0.062 
1 Significantly different from RS at 95% confidence l vel. 
2 Significantly different from SG at 99% confidence l vel. 
3 Significantly different from RS at 99% confidence l vel. 
QALYs is not significant, even though the mean rank correlation coefficient is 
higher for RS-QALYs in both samples. 
The Swedish responses are more consistent with the given direct ranking than 
the Dutch responses for each of the three methods. The difference in mean rank 
correlation coefficient between the Swedish and the Dutch responses i significant 
at the 90% confidence level for the rating scale and for the standard gamble, but it 
is not significant for the time trade-off. 
Table 6 was constructed under the assumption of no discounting. Table 7 shows 
the results for a discount rate of 5%. This is the situation most frequently 
encountered in cost utility analyses. 
A comparison between Tables 6 and 7 reveals that 5% discounting reduces the 
rank correlation coefficients for rating scale and time trade-off and increases the 
rank correlation coefficient for the standard gamble. Even though the difference is 
less significant, the rank correlation with the direct ranking is still higher for 
TTO-QALYs than for RS-QALYs and SG-QALYs. For the latter two, the 
difference between the mean rank correlation coefficients is not significant. 
A comparison between Tables 6 and 7 shows that for the standard gamble the 
mean rank correlation coefficient increases with 5% discounting. The difference 
between the mean rank correlation coefficients is highly significant (p  < 0.001). 
Table 7 
Mean Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the direct ranking and the predicted rankings of 
RS-QALYs, TTO-QALYs and SG-QALYs. Standard errors within parentheses. Five per cent discount- 
ing 
Comparison Dutch sample Swedish sample Total sample Difference, NL -  S 
RS--direct 0.7058 (0.035) 0.7795 (0~030) 0,7401 (0.023) n.s. 
TTO--direct 0.7886 t,2 (0,028) 0.8481 I (0.020) 0,8162 2,3 (0.018) p = 0.086 
SG--direct 0.7297 (0.033) 0.8274 (0.026) 0.7752 (0.023) p = 0.022 
i Significantly different from RS at 90% confidence l vel. 
2 Significantly different from SG at 90% confidence l vel. 
3 Significantly different from RS at 95% confidence l vel. 
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Fig. 1. The relationships between discount rates and rank correlation coefficients. The figure displays 
the relationship for RS-QALYs, TTO-QALYs and SG-QALYs between the mean Spearman correlation 
coefficient and the discount rate used. Positive discounting makes QALY-based decision making more 
consistent with individual preferences elicited by direct ranking for the standard gamble, but less 
consistent for the time trade-off and the rating scale. 
Fig. 1 shows for the total sample that for discount rates higher than 5%, the rank 
correlation coefficient for SG-QALYs increases even more. For the total sample 
the maximizing discount rate for SG-QALYs is 15.5% (rcc = 0.789), For the 
Swedish sample the maximum rank correlation coefficient for SG-QALYs is 
attained at a discount rate of approximately 9% (rcc = 0.835). For the Dutch 
sample the maximum rank correlation coefficient for SG-QALYs is attained at a 
discount rate of approximately 16% (rcc = 0.760). 
For the rating scale and the time trade-off we observe the opposite pattern: 5% 
discounting has a decreasing impact on the mean rank correlation coefficient. For 
the rating scale the difference is significant at the 5% level. For the time trade-off 
the difference is significant at the 0.1% level. Fig. 1 shows that the maximizing 
discount rate for RS-QALYs is approximately -5% (rcc = 0.769) for the total 
sample. For the Swedish and the Dutch samples the maximizing discount rates for 
RS-QALYs are -1% (rcc = 0.804) and -5% (rcc = 0.756), respectively. For 
TFO-QALYs the maximizing discount rate is approximately - 1% (rcc = 0.850). 
For the Dutch and Swedish samples the maximizing discount rates are -5% 
(rcc = 0.829) and - 1% (rcc = 0.876), respectively. 
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5.3. Majority voting 
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Table 8 summarizes the evidence on majority voting. Profiles are shown in 
decreasing order of preference according to majority voting. The first column 
shows the results for the direct ranking exercise. Columns two to four show the 
results for the three methods with no discounting and columns five to seven show 
the results for the three methods with 5% discounting. The number in parentheses 
shows the percentage of respondents who favour the profile over the profile 
coming next in preference. For example, the column "Direct" shows that in the 
direct ranking task profile 2 came out as most preferred, profile 3 as second most 
preferred, profile 4 as third most preferred, etc. Profile 2 was preferred by all 
respondents o profile 3, profile 3 was preferred by all respondents o profile 4, 
and profile 4 was preferred by 71% of respondents o profile 6. 
Table 8 shows that for no discounting, the ranking predicted by TTO-QALYs 
corresponds most closely to the ranking being given: the predicted rank order of 
the profiles is similar to the rank order elicited in the direct ranking task. 
Moreover, the predicted percentage of respondents °' voting" in favour of a profile 
is in most cases quite similar to the percentage of respondents "voting" in favour 
of a profile according to direct ranking. To obtain insight in the correspondence of 
the proportions voting in favour of a particular profile, we calculated the correla- 
tion coefficients between the proportion of votes in favour of profile i over profile 
j based on the direct ranking and the predicted proportion of votes in favour of 
Table 8 
Majority vote ordering of profiles. The direct ranking of profiles is shown in the first column and the 
following columns show the predicted ranking of profiles based on RS-QALYs, TrO-QALYs and 
SG-QALYs with 0 and 5% discounting. The proportions of individuals preferring a profile to the next 
profile in the ordering are shown within parentheses I 
Direct RS (0%) TTO (0%) SG (0%) RS (5%) TTO (5%) SG (5%) 
2 (100%) 2 (100%) 2 (100%) 2 (100%) 2 (100%) 2 (100%) 2 (100%) 
3 (100%) 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 3 (64%) 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 
4 (71%) 4 (100%) 4 (75%) 1 (54% vs. 59%) 4 (100%) 4 (55%) 4 (60%) 
6 (84%) 5 (75%) 6 (62%) 4 = 7 (55% vs. 59%) 5 (78%) 6 (55%) 6 (59%) 
7 (52%) 6 (95%) 7 (56%) 6 (98%) 7 (58%) 7 (66%) 
5 (53%) 7 (95%) 5 (50.3%) 6 (79%) 7 (99%) i (56%) 1 (51%) 
i 1 t 5 1 5 5 
p 0.902 0.988 0.859 0.868 0.951 0.970 
For SG-QALYs with no discounting profiles 4 and 7 were given the same ordering according to the 
majority voting rule (i.e. the proportion of respondents "voting for" 4 over 7 was exactly 50%). The 
54% vs. 59% given in parentheses means that 54% were predicted to prefer profile 1 to profile 4 and 
59% were predicted to prefer profile I to profile 7. The 55% vs. 59% given in parentheses similarly 
means that 55% were predicted to prefer profile 4 to profile 6 and 59% were predicted to prefer profile 
7 to profile 6. 
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profile i over profile j based on each of the three methods. These correlation 
coefficients are shown in the bottom rows of Table 8.5 In the situation of no 
discounting the correlation coefficient is significantly higher for the time trade-off 
than for the rating scale and the standard gamble at the 0.1% significance level. 6 
The difference between rating scale and standard gamble is not significant. In the 
situation of 5% discounting the correlation coefficient is highest for the standard 
gamble. Only the difference between standard gamble and rating scale is signifi- 
cant (p  = 0.022). 
Table 8 also suggests an explanation why SG-QALYs and RS-QALYs are less 
consistent with the results of the direct ranking exercise than TTO-QALYs. The 
explanation we suggest is that the standard gamble assigns too much weight to 
health state D compared to the weight implied by direct ranking. The rating scale 
does not assign enough weight to health state D compared to the weight implied 
by direct ranking. To illustrate the first claim made, that the standard gamble 
assigns too much weight compared to direct ranking, compare for example profiles 
1 and 5. The difference between profiles 1 and 5 is that profile 1 offers more life 
years than profile 5, but these life years are spent in a lower quality of life. Profile 
1 will be preferred to profile 5 if the utility gain of 8 additional years in health 
state D more than compensates the utility loss of spending the first 12 years in 
health state D rather than in full health. For example, in the situation of no 
discounting, profile 1 will be preferred to profile 5 if 8 * [U(D) -  U(immediate 
death)] > 12. [U(full health) - U(D)]. 7 Or, given the scaling of U, if U(D) > 0.6. 
Table 8 shows that according to the standard gamble profile 1 is preferred to 
profile 5 by a majority of respondents In fact 70.9% preferred profile 1 to profile 5 
according to SG-QALYs. Thus 70.9% of the respondents assigned a quality 
weight greater than 0.6 to health state D by the standard gamble. However, in the 
direct ranking a majority of respondents (53%) ranked profile 5 above profile 1, 
which implies that only 47% of the respondents assigned a quality weight greater 
than 0.6 to health state D in the direct ranking task. Thus, compared to the direct 
ranking the standard gamble gives too much weight to health state D. 
Positive discounting has the effect of reducing the utility gain of profile 1 over 
profile 5 relative to the utility loss. For example with 5% discounting the utility 
gain is 3.78 * U(D) and the utility loss is 9.31 * [1 - U(D)]. Profile 1 will now be 
preferred to profile 5 if U(D) > 0.71. Those respondents who assigned a standard 
gamble weight between 0.6 and 0.71 will now prefer profile 5 to profile 1. Thus, 
s Obviously if the pair (i, j), i.e the proportion of voters favouring profile i over profile j, was 
included in the calculation ( j ,  i) was not. The pair (j ,  i) is the complement of (i, j )  and therefore no 
new information is added to the analysis by including (j, i). 
6 In testing for significance use was made of Fisher's Z-transformation: Z v = 0.5 * ln[(1 + p) / ( l -  
p)l. 
7 Note that this analysis assumes intertemporal separability of individual preferences. However, this 
is an assumption that has to be made to characterize QALYs as a utility model. 
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Table 9 
Correlation coefficients for the two samples for the majority vote ordering of profiles 
169 
Sample (% discounted) RS TTO SG 
NL (0) 0.879 0.979 L2 0.806 
S (0) 0.924 0,982 2,3 0.862 
NL (5) 0.856 0,932 0.928 
S (5) 0.894 0.948 0,981 i
I Significantly different from RS at 99% confidence l vel. 
2 Significantly different from SG at 99% confidence l vel. 
3 Significantly different from RS at 95% confidence l vel. 
positive discounting has the effect of making SG-QALYs more consistent with 
direct ranking by decreasing the number of respondents who are predicted to 
prefer profile 1 to profile 5. 
The hypothesis that the rating scale assigns too low a weight o health state D 
compared to the weight implied by the direct ranking can be seen for example by 
comparing profiles 5 and 6. With no discounting a similar calculation exercise as 
above shows that profile 6 will be preferred to profile 5 if U(D) > 0.5. The direct 
ranking exercise revealed that a majority of respondents preferred profile 6 to 
profile 5 (64.6%). That is, 64.6% of the respondents a signed a weight greater than 
0.5 to health state D in the direct ranking task. However, in the rating scale task 
only 25% of the respondents a signed a weight greater than 0.5 to health state D. 
Obviously, for the rating scale positive discounting only makes things worse. With 
5% discounting profile 6 will be preferred to profile 5 if U(D)> 0.55. Thus 
respondents who give a quality weight between 0.50 and 0.55 to health state D are 
now predicted by RS-QALYs to prefer profile 5. 
Table 9 displays the results for the Swedish and Dutch samples eparately. We 
observe a similar pattern as for the total sample. Correlation coefficients are 
without exception higher in the Swedish sample. However, the difference between 
the two samples is only significant for SG(5%) (p = 0.000). 
5.4. Borda rule 
Table 10 shows social preferences according to the Borda rule for the total 
sample. Recall from Section 4 that in a comparison of profiles, the profile with the 
lowest score is preferred. Thus for the direct ranking exercise the preference order 
implied by theBordaru le i s2>3>4>6>7> 1>5.  
Table 10 shows that in the situation where no discounting is applied the ranking 
predicted by TTO-QALYs is most closely related to the direct ranking. Table 10 
confirms the pattern we already observed with respect o Table 8. The standard 
gamble assigns too high a quality weight o health state D compared to the weight 
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Table 10 
Mean Borda scores for the health profiles. The first column shows the Borda scores based on the direct 
ranking of profiles and the following columns hows the Borda scores based on the predicted ranking 
of profiles for RS-QALYs, TI'O-QALYs and SG-QALYs with no discounting and 5% discounting 
Profile Direct RS (0%) TTO (0%) SG (0%) RS (5%) TFO (5%) SG (5%) 
1 5.31 
2 1.03 
3 2.17 
4 3,82 
5 5.55 
6 4.42 
7 5,24 
Plotal 
PNL 
Ps 
6.69 4.99 3.88 6.91 4.84 4.97 
1 1.05 1.16 1 1.06 1.11 
2.01 2,21 2.49 2.01 2,36 2.40 
3.08 3.81 4.43 3.05 4.33 4.20 
4.55 5.63 6.22 4.33 6.06 5.94 
4,77 4.77 4.88 4,80 4.62 4.63 
5.75 5.04 4.58 5.90 4.71 4,75 
0.923 0.992 0,895 0.901 0.970 0,980 
0.905 0.990 0.874 0.885 0.962 0.959 
0.941 0.993 0.916 0.917 0.977 0,992 
implied by the direct ranking exercise. Positive discounting mitigates this effect: 
with 5% discounting SG-QALYs more closely reflect the direct ranking. The 
rating scale assigns too low a weight to health state D compared to the weight 
implied by the direct ranking exercise. Positive discounting reinforces this effect. 
The final three rows of Table 10 report for the total sample, the Dutch sample 
and the Swedish sample the correlation coefficients of the Borda scores assigned 
by the three methods with the Borda scores calculated on the basis of the direct 
ranking. 8 These confirm the remarks made above: the scores predicted by 
TTO-QALYs are most closely related to the scores resulting from the direct 
ranking in the case of no discounting. In the case of 5% discounting, the scores 
predicted by SG-QALYs are most closely related to the scores predicted by direct 
ranking. 
6. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this study was to compare RS-QALYs, TTO-QALYs and SG- 
QALYs in terms of their ability to predict individual preferences over health 
profiles. The reason we compared the predictions of the three models with 
individual preferences i  that the latter are the basic data that decision theory seeks 
to explain. Individual preferences were measured by direct ranking of a number of 
health profiles. 
s No significance is reported here. For Jess than 10 observations the test based on Fisher's 
Z-transformation is not sufficiently accurate. 
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The results of the experiment reported in this paper show that, in the situation 
of no discounting, the correlation between predicted ranking and direct ranking 
was significantly higher for TTO-QALYs than for RS-QALYs and SG-QALYs. 
This result held both in terms of average Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
calculated for each individual and in terms of two social choice rules each 
satisfying a different subset of Arrow's "reasonable conditions." No significant 
differences were observed between RS-QALYs and SG-QALYs, though in general 
RS-QALYs were slightly more consistent with the direct ranking of profiles. 
The most common procedure in economic evaluations i to discount QALYs at 
a fixed rate, generally 5%. With a 5% discount rate the correlation between the 
predicted ranking and the direct ranking increased for SG-QALYs, but decreased 
for TTO-QALYs and for RS-QALYs. As we outlined in the previous ections, the 
reason SG-QALYs more closely reflect he direct ranking may be that the standard 
gamble assigns a relatively high weight to health state D compared to the weight 
implied by the direct ranking exercise. In the context of our experiment, positive 
discounting will mitigate this relatively high weight. The suggestion that the 
standard gamble as it is typically asked in health state valuation, by probability 
equivalence, results in a relatively high quality weight is consistent with previous 
findings in the literature (e.g. Hershey and Schoemaker (1985)). 
The conclusions described above are entirely based on an analysis of statisti- 
cally significant differences. It could be argued that even though the correlation 
between predicted and direct ranking was statistically significantly higher for 
TTO-QALYs than for RS-QALYs and SG-QALYs, the differences between the 
methods are not economically important (for a discussion of the distinction 
between statistical significance and economic importance see McCloskey (1983)). 
This argument is based on the observation that all methods performed well, 
because the correlation coefficients were rather high for all three methods by the 
standards usually used to judge the size of correlation coefficients (cf. Landis and 
Koch, 1977). 
However, one can object to the above argument. It is difficult to interpret the 
absolute size of the correlation coefficients in the context of this study and to 
judge the size of the correlation coefficients by the usual standards. The reason is 
that the predicted ranking of some of the profiles will by definition be the same as 
the direct ranking as long as individual preferences satisfy monotonicity with 
respect o years in full health (i.e. preferences between profiles 2, 3, 4 and 5 are 
obvious) and as long as the individual prefers years in full health to years in health 
state D (i.e. profile 2 will always be preferred to profiles 6 and 7 and profile 3 will 
always be preferred to profile 6). To illustrate the impact on the size of the 
correlation coefficients of profiles for which the ranking is obvious, we redid the 
analysis using only the two combinations of health profiles for which the ordering 
was not obvious beforehand. These combinations are profiles l, 4, 6 and 7 and 
profiles l, 5, 6 and 7. For the analysis including only profiles l, 4, 6 and 7 the 
mean Spearman rank correlation coefficient between predicted and direct ranking 
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is 0.55 for TTO-QALYs, 0.46 for RS-QALYs and 0.28 for SG-QALYs. 9 Trans- 
lated to the classification scheme of Landis and Koch (1977) these rank correlation 
coefficients would classify as "moderate" for TTO-QALYs and for RS-QALYs 
and as "fair" for SG-QALYs. For the analysis including only the profiles 1, 5, 6 
and 7 the mean Spearman rank correlation coefficient between predicted and direct 
ranking is 0.54 for TTO-QALYs, 0.30 for RS-QALYs and 0.35 for SG-QALYs. 10 
According to the classification scheme of Landis and Koch (1977) the correlation 
is "moderate" for TTO-QALYs and "fair" for RS-QALYs and for SG-QALYs. 
The pattern is for both combinations quite similar to the pattern we observed when 
all health profiles were included in the analysis except that the mean rank 
correlation coefficients are lower. The differences between the mean rank correla- 
tion coefficients are larger and the correlation coefficients do not all fall in the 
same class according to the classification scheme of Landis and Koch (1977). If 
one is prepared to adopt the classification scheme suggested by Landis and Koch, 
which is based on the idea that differences of about 0.20 are meaningful, then the 
results of this paper suggest hat the differences between the methods may not 
only be statistically significant, but also meaningful. It is, however, difficult to 
determine xactly what difference in correlation coefficients is economically 
meaningful. That is, how close is close? This may be an issue for future debate. It 
should be emphasized once again that this paper has only shown that the 
correlation between the implied rankings and the direct rankings is statistically 
significantly higher for TTO-QALYs than for RS-QALYs and for SG-QALYs. 
As far as we know, this study is the first which compares the performance of 
RS-QALYs, TTO-QALYs and SG-QALYs in terms of direct ranking. Apart from 
offering some tentative conclusions, this paper also raises various questions which 
may be addressed in future research. First, we measured individual preferences by 
direct ranking of the seven profiles simultaneously. It is possible that the directly 
measured rankings have provided a less than ideal assessment of respondents' 
preferences because of the cognitive burden of the ranking exercise (cf. Fisher, 
1979). A different procedure would be to confront individuals with all possible 
pairs of profiles and to construct a preference ordering from these answers. It is 
not clear a priori whether the two approaches give identical results. For example, 
our approach excluded intransitivities. The pairwise approach on the other hand 
might lead to intransitivities. Second, the approach we used in the time trade-off 
9 The difference between the mean rank correlation coefficients for TTO-QALYs and for RS-QALYs 
is not statistically significant. The difference between the mean rank correlation coefficients for 
TI'O-QALYs and for SG-QALYs is significant at the 0.1% level. The difference between the mean 
rank correlation coefficients for RS-QALYs and for SG-QALYs is significant at the 5% level. 
l0 The difference between the mean rank correlation coefficients for TTO-QALYs and for RS-QALYs 
and between the mean rank correlation coefficients for TTO-QALYs and for SG-QALYs are 
significant at the 0.1% level. The difference between the mean rank correlation coefficients for 
RS-QALYs and for SG-QALYs is not statistically significant. 
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and standard gamble questions is close to the ping-pong approach favoured by 
many researchers in the field, but it is not exactly similar. Moreover, to accommo- 
date imprecision of preferences we allowed respondents to indicate ranges of 
values. Although we do not believe that our slightly different procedures have 
affected the results, it may be worth investigating the sensitivity of the results to 
this difference in approach. Third, we used only one health state and only a limited 
number of profiles for which the ranking was not obvious. It may be that the time 
trade-off is a useful heuristic for a number of health states, but that it does not 
work equally well for all health states (cf. Stalmeier et al. (1996)). It is worth 
redoing the analysis using different health states and profiles. Fourth, the fact that 
we used group sessions rather than individual sessions may have decreased the 
care with which some individuals answered the questionnaire. This may, in 
particular, have affected the standard gamble responses. The standard gamble is 
generally considered to be the most complicated method of the three. On the other 
hand, as can be seen from Table 5, the pattern of differences in quality weights 
between the methods is similar to that observed in other studies. Fifth, it is 
possible that the performance of the methods is affected by the ordering of the 
tasks in the experiment. All respondents were first asked to perform the rating 
scale task, then the time trade-off task and finally the standard gamble task. The 
reason we opted for this order was that in general the rating scale is considered the 
easiest method to answer and the standard gamble the most complicated. However, 
it may be that during the experiment respondents became more aware of their 
"true" preferences and thus the higher consistency of TTO-QALYs over RS- 
QALYs may simply be a consequence of the order in which the tasks were 
performed. Even though at the end of the experiment we urged respondents to 
carefully read through their responses again and to make changes where they 
thought appropriate, ordering effects may have affected the results. Future experi- 
mental studies may wish to randomize the order of the tasks or, alternatively, 
respondents may be asked to perform only one task. 
Finally, two notes of warning are worth making. First, we interpreted QALYs 
as a utility model. Even though this appears to be the most common interpretation 
of QALYs (for example the recent debate on the merits of QALYs vs. healthy-years 
equivalents (Buckingham (1993); Culyer and Wagstaff (1993); Culyer and 
Wagstaff (1995); Gafni et al. (1993); Loomes (1995); Johannesson (1995); Ble- 
ichrodt (1995)) focused on the question of the consistency of QALYs with 
individual preferences), there are other interpretations, as we remarked before. 
Second, our results only bear relevance for the descriptive validity of the various 
QALY models. It may be that for normative/prescriptive reasons, which are more 
relevant in health economics and medical decision making, one wishes to stick to 
SG-QALYs. Moreover, if QALYs are intended as decision aids to prescribe 
individual choices, the paradoxical result emerges that once a model corresponds 
perfectly with direct choices the model looses its significance for prescriptive 
purposes. In the case of perfect correspondence one could simply let individuals 
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choose intuitively and no decision-aiding analysis would contribute anymore. 
Predictive models can only be of use if they deviate somewhat from actual choice. 
The question then obviously is how much we allow our measures to deviate from 
actual choice. This is a question that may be picked up in future research. 
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